University of Baltimore Law

ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Scholarship

1977

Survey of Criminal Procedure — Alternative
Dispositions of Defendants
Charles Shafer
University of Baltimore School of Law, cshafer@ubalt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Supreme Court of
the United States Commons
Recommended Citation
Survey of Criminal Procedure — Alternative Dispositions of Defendants, 30 Rutgers L. Rev. 592 (1976-1977)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

Survey of Criminal ProcedureAlternative Dispositions of Defendants
The criminal justice system provides various alternatives for the
disposition of criminal defendants. Three of these alternatives, pretrial
intervention, drug treatment, and probation, were dealt with in recent
New Jersey Supreme Court decisions. The court examined the substantive criteria and procedures used in assigning each disposition and
focused primarily on the desire to provide rehabilitative opportunities
for each defendant. This note will examine those decisions and the
implications of the court's concentration on the goal of rehabilitation.

I.

PRETRIAL INTERVENTION

In State v. Leonardis 1 and in subsequently issued "Guidelines for
Operation of Pretrial Intervention in New Jersey," 2 the court established new criteria and procedures governing admission to Pretrial
Intervention (PTI) Programs. These programs provide defendants
the opportunity to have complaints or indictments dismissed with
the approval of the program director and the prosecutor upon successful participation in a program of treatment and counseling. 3
In Leonardis, the court invalidated restrictive Bergen County PTI
admissions criteria and held that PTI programs may no longer use
the nature of the crime with which the defendant is charged as the
sole basis for rejection. 4 Under the Bergen County criteria, defen1. 71 N.J. 85, 363 A.2d 321 (1976), Motion for Clarification and Rehearing
Granted, No. M-1234 (Sept. 8, 1976).
2. 99 N.J.L.J. 865 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Guidelines].
3. N.J. CT. R. 3:28 authorizes the county assignment judge (or a judge he
appoints) to suspend proceedings against any defendant on recommendation of the
program director with the consent of the prosecutor and the defendant. The program
lasts three months, after which the charges against the defendant are dismissed, the
program is extended three months, or the defendant is returned to the ordinary
course of prosecution. Participation is limited to two three-month periods, except
in cases of drug dependency.
The supreme court has approved PTI programs in 17 counties. See J. Paul,
Pretrial Intervention: A Report On A Workshop Sponsored by the N.J. Bar Institute
& Law Center, Feb., 1976, 99 N.J.L.J. 865, 875 (1976); Notice to the Bar Re PTf
in Ocean County, 100 N.J.L.J. 121 (1977); Notice Re PTI in Burlington County,
id.; Notice to the Bar Re PTI in Hunterdon County, 100 N.J.L.J. 91 (1977); Notice
to the Bar Re PTI in Somerset County, 100 N.J.L.J. 78 (1977); Notice to the Bar Re
PTI in Salem County, 100 N.J.L.J. 66 (1977). For a description of the New
Jersey PTI Program, see 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 1203 (1975). The court has also
provided an extensive discussion of the legal background of PTI. 71 N.J. at 92-107,
363 A.2d at 324-32.
4. 71 N.J. at 112, 363 A.2d at 335. Leonardis combined the appeals of three
defendants, two from Bergen County and one from Hudson County. The issues
raised by the appeal of the Hudson County defendant are discussed at text accompanying notes 26-33 infra.
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dants charged with certain offenses were ordinarily denied entrance
into the program. 5 Two of the defendants in Leonardis, one charged
with possession with intent to distribute marijuana and the other
indicted for conspiracy to distribute marijuana, had been summarily
excluded because "sale of a controlled dangerous substance" was
listed as one of those offenses. 6
The court determined that since the main purpose of PTI programs
is rehabilitation, admission should be based not on the offense but
on the offender's capacity for rehabilitation. Important considerations ignored by the Bergen County officials were "the defendant's
willingness to avoid conviction and its attendant stigma, the motivation behind the commission of the crime, the age and past criminal
record of the defendant and his current rehabilitation efforts." 7 In
striking down the Bergen County admissions standards, the court
expressed concern for the possibility that arbitrary denial of the rehabilitative benefits of PTI may be a denial of equal protection. s
Noting, however, that the United States Supreme Court would prob5. The following offenses were expressly excluded under the Bergen County
criteria:
1. Heinous Offenses: Atrocious Assault and Battery where the victim is
seriously injured; HOmicide; Mayhem; Forcible Rape; Assault and Battery
on a Police Officer involving injury; Armed Robbery where the victim is
injured; Sale of a Controlled Dangerous Substance. . . .
2. Offenses Related to Psychological Disorder: . . . . Arson, aberrant sexual
behavior including Incest, Sodomy, Indecent Exposure, when associated
with psychological defect or the use of force to attempt any sexual act. . . .
3. Victimless Crimes . . . : Prostitution and Gambling. . . .
Bergen County Pre-Trial Intervention Project ( unpaginated) ( undated).
The Hudson County PTI program excluded offenders charged with "heinous
offenses," including crimes of extreme violence when associated with serious injury
and sale or dispensing of significant amounts of controlled dangerous substances
or other drugs, especially where not associated with the applicant's addiction. Zaloom,
Pretrial Intervention Under New Jersey Court Rule 3:28, Proposed Guidelines for
Operation, 2 CRIMINAL JUSTICE QUARTERLY 178, 185 (1974).
6. The supreme court opinion states only that defendant Leonardis was charged
with possession of marijuana. The actual complaint filed against Leonardis charged
him with "possession with intent to distribute." Brief for Defendant-Appellant in
Support of Motion for Leave to Appeal at 2, State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 363
A.2d 321 (1976). Apparently there was proof that Leonardis intended to sell the
marijuana, because the defendant's statement of facts acknowledged that the
offense "involved the sale of marijuana." Id. There is no separate New Jersey
Rather, sales are
statute covering "sale" of controlled dangerous substances.
subsumed under "distribution." See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-19 (Supp. 1976).
7. 71 N.J. at 112, 363 A.2d at 335.
'
The defendants contended that the program officials were not fairly applying
their own criteria because use of the phrase "ordinarily excluded" implied that
even those charged with "heinous offenses" should have an opportunity to present
arguments for their admission. Id. at 110, 363 A.2d at 334. The court, however,
was careful to point out that it was not merely examining the criteria "as applied."
Rather, the court found that the criteria themselves unduly emphasized the nature
of the offense. Id. at 111-12, 363 A.2d at 335.
8. Id. at 112-13, 363 A.2d at 335-36.
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ably not find that equal protection gives rise to a right to rehabilitation,9 the New Jersey court characterized its decision as an interpretation of court rules. 10 The court also expressed concern for the equal
protection implications of the county-by-county variations in the
availability of PTI throughout the state and urged adoption of a
unifonn statewide program based on the principles espoused in

Leonardis.l1
Two months after the Leonardis opinion the supreme court adopted
PTI Guidelines as the foundation for such a statewide program. The
Guidelines, which apply to all state PTI programs, set forth the goals
of PTI, criteria to be employed in making admissions decisions, and
procedures for defendants to contest unfavorable decisions on the
part of prosecutors or program officials. The spirit of Leonardis is
maintained by requiring that admission decisions be based on the
defendant's "amenability to correction [and] responsiveness to rehabilitation" as well as on the nature of the offense. 12 The Guidelines
require, therefore, that programs consider applications from "[ a]ny
defendant accused of crime," and accept any defendant who "demonstrates sufficient effort to effect necessary behavioral change and
show[s] that future criininal behavior will not occur." 13
The Guidelines, however, retreat somewhat from the position that
it is improper to predicate admissions on the nature of the defendant's

9. See Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974).
10. 71 N.J. at 108-09, 363 A.2d at 333-34.
11. Id. at 120-21, 363 A.2d at 340. This reasoning was adopted in State v.
Kowitski, 145 N.J. Super. 237, 367 A.2d 459 (Law Div. 1976) (defendant denied
equal protection of law because county in which crime was committed had no
PTI program while "right" of access to PTI was granted defendants in other
counties; rendered moot by adoption of Somerset County PTI program).
12. Guidelines, supra note 2, at 865.
13. Id. at 874 (Guideline 2). The court's action reflects a national trend
toward expanding the scope of diversionary programs to include persons charged
with crimes once considered quite serious. Barriers to drug offenders in particular
are being abolished. R. NIMMER, DIVERSION: THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE FORMS
OF PROSECUTION 17, 49-50, 57-58 (1974). Both the New Jersey Supreme Court
and the legislature have previously endorsed a policy of avoiding harsh penalties
for minor drug offenders. Cf. State v. Ward, 57 N.J. 75, 270 A.2d 1 (1970);
State v. Staten, 62 N.J. 435, 303 A.2d 65 (1973) (per curiam). But cf. State v.
Knight, 72 N.J. 193,369 A.2d 913 (1976) (refusal to review trial court's choice
of prison term instead of Youth Correctional Institutional Complex commitment for
twenty-two-year-old heroin addict never previously incarcerated). The expansion
of PTI programs coincides with a growing dissatisfaction with the results of prolonged incarceration and a desire, therefore, to impose the shortest possible periods
of confinement. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. ON SENTENCING AND REVIEW, A.B.A.
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 61-63
(Approved Draft 1968); MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962);
TASK FORCE ON ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REpORT: THE COURTS
15 (1967).
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offense. 14 For example, the Guidelines emphasize PTI's concern with
the '1ess serious" offenses by stating that one purpose of PTI is to
divert consideration of those offenses from the courts in order to "focus
expenditure of criminal justice resources on matters involving serious
criminal and severe correctional problems." 15 Furthermore, although
defendants accused of any crime are eligible for admission, Guideline
3 ( i ) requires that programs should ordinariI y reject defendants
charged with crimes which are:
"( 1) part of organized criminal activity; or (2) part of a continuing
criminal business or enterprise; or ( 3 ) deliberately committed with
violence or threat of violence against another person; or (4) a breach
of the public trust where admission to a PTI program would deprecate
the seriousness of defendant's crime . . . . " 16

The Guidelines also provide that several other gro,:!ps of offenders
should ordinarily be rejected, i.e., defendants who have previously
been convicted of crimes of a "serious nature" or who have previously
been enrolled in PTI or similar programs. 17
Therefore, while the court recognizes that it may be unwise to
admit to PTI those who have committed serious crimes, Guideline
3 ( i) redefines the term "serious crime" for purposes of PTI. Guideline
3 ( i) presents a potential problem in that the standards used in the
redefinition do not appear to further the court's avowed goals of uniformity and predictability of decisions,18 simply because they are not
the kind of standards that can ever be reduced to uniformity and
predictability. In contrast to the Bergen County criteria which listed
specific crimes which ordinarily precluded admission,19 Guideline
3 ( i) dictates that defendants charged with crimes in four broad
categories be excluded. 20 Those categories require subjective determinations based on more factors than the alleged criminal acts. The
court does not supply standards for deciding whether an act is part
of organized crime,21 a continUing criminal enterprise, or a breach of
public trust. Similarly, Guideline 3( e) mandates that those who
14. The "retreat" from Leonardis is also made evident in the heavy burden
placed on those who are denied admission to PTI to challenge that determination.
See text accompanying note 29 infra.
15. Guidelines, supra note 2, at 865 (Guideline 1 (D)) (emphasis added).
16. Guidelines, supra note 2, at 874.
17.Id. (Guidelines 3(E), 3(G)).
18. See State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. at 98, 363 A.2d at 328.
19. See note 5 supra.
20. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
21. For examples of the difficulty involved in using "organized crime as a
legal standard, see Catalano v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 346, 349-50 (D. Conn.
1974). For an example of the scope of activity that could be subsumed under
"organized crime," see "Hustler" Conviction Is Pondered in Ohio, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 10, 1977, at 21, col. 6 (collaboration to promote obscene magazine is within
Ohio's organized crime statute).
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have previously committed "serious" crimes should ordinarily be ex"
eluded without further explanation as to which crimes are "serious." 22
Moreover, the court's general mandate that decisions be based on
the defendant's "amenability to correction [and] responsiveness to
rehabilitation" provides no explanation of the bases on which such
determinations are to be made. It is doubtful that anyone can accurately predict who will successfully respond to a PTI program. 23
Nevertheless, the court assumes that program officials can identify
such individuals.24
The court's effort to open the program to more defendants and the
concomitant replacement of definite criteria with vague standards
may increase the exercise of individual discretion by program officials
without adequate review or guidance. In this respect, therefore, the
Guidelines may be counterproductive of the goal of statewide uniformity.25
In addition to the court's redefinition of substantive PTI admission
standards, the court has also changed PTI admissions procedures. In
Leonardis, the court affirmed a Hudson County trial judge's order
that the prosecutor must provide a written explanation for his refusal
to admit a defendant into PTI.26 The court viewed this requirement
22. Guidelines, supra note 2, at 865.
23. No controlled study of PTI has ever been made in New Jersey. Paul,
supra note 3, at 879. For an analysis of statistical claims of success of the Manhattan Court Employment Project, which indicates that no conclusion can be drawn
as to the effectiveness of that program, see Zimring, Measuring the Impact of
Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Justice System, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 224 (1974).
The inability to evaluate offenders on an ad hoc, individualized basis is demonstrated by the United States Board of Parole's decision to abandon the rehabilitative model in determining parole eligibility. Coffee, The Future of Sentencing
Reform: Emerging Legal Issues in the Individualization of Justice, 73 MICH. L. REV.
1361, 1440-41 (1975). The date of parole is now determined largely by guidelines which rate inmates on the basis of the seriousness of the offense they have
committed and a "salient factor score" which is a function of objective criteria
such as prior convictions, age, age at first conviction, education, and proposed
living site upon release. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1976). These factors determine whether
or not the prospective parolee is in a class of people likely to commit another crime.
One commentator points out that by using such criteria, "the Board has implicitly
acknowledged that it is unable to judge or measure rehabilitative progress and so
will confine its efforts to seeking to incapacitate offenders." Coffee, supra, at 1441.
See also Parole Release Decisions and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L. REV.
810, 820-24 (1975).
24. The court may have been impressed by claims of success of various programs. For example, the Hudson County program cites case histories of "successfully
rehabilitated" defendants such as "Sergio Q.:' whose offense of atrocious assault
and battery was determined to be the result of his unemployment. After being
provided with counseling and a job, he did not repeat the offense. Zaloom, supra
note 5, at 187-88. The program, however, does not report the number of such
diagnoses which turned out to be wrong. The claims of success of many diversionary programs are based on such impressionistic judgments, rather than on empirical studies. NIMMER, supra note 13, at 4.
25. 71 N.J. at 120-21, 363 A.2d at 340.
26. Id. at 119, 363 A.2d at 339.
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as consistent with the national and state trend toward imposing due
process requirements on all government decisions which result in a
"grievous loss" of liberty or property. Here, the defendant's interest
in obtaining the rehabilitative benefits of a PTI program warranted
at least a statement of reasons for denial of admission. The court
also noted that recorded reasons for exclusion from the program will
facilitate judicial review of the prosecutor's actions, further the goals
of PTI by providing information on which to evaluate and improve
the still experimental programs, and serve the rehabilitative function
by causing defendants to feel that they have been dealt with fairly.27
The Guidelines further expand the procedural protections afforded
the defendant. Each defendant is given the opportunity to present
arguments for his acceptance in the program and to contest his exclusion. Under the Guidelines, "[ w ]hen the application indicates factors
which would ordinarily lead to exclusion . . . the applicant nevertheless shall have the opportunity to present . . . any facts or materials demonstrating his amenability to the rehabilitative process,
shOWing compelling reasons justifying his admission and establishing
that a decision against enrollment would be arbitrary and unreasonable." 28
Following the court's language in Leonardis, the Guidelines require
program directors as well as prosecutors to disclose their reasons for
granting or denying requests for PTI admissions in writing. Furthermore, the defendants may challenge these decisions before the designated judge. "The challenge is to be based upon alleged arbitrary
or capricious action, and the defendant has the burd~n 5>f showing
that the program director or prosecutor abused his discretion in processing the application. . .. [T]hereafter, defendant or prosecutor
"
"29
can . . . appe alfrom the court'sdeclslon....
The new admission procedures represent a continuation of a trend
to increase procedural protections available in New Jersey PTI programs. In 1974, the New Jersey court rules were amended to give
the accused an opportunity to be heard, with counsel, on a recommendation that the prosecution proceed after the accused had participated in the program; The defendant was also protected from
27. ld. at 114-19, 363 A.2d at 336-39. For further discussion of the reasons
given in sentencing, see 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 657 (1977).
28. GUidelines, supra note 2, at 874 (Guideline 2). Prior to promulgation of
the Guidelines, a hearing was required only for those enrolled in PTI and returned
to the ordinary course of prosecution. No opportunity was provided to challenge
the denial of admission to PTI at the outset. N.J. CT. R. 3:28.
29. Guidelines, supra note 2, at 875 (Guideline 8). The jurisdiction of appellate
courts to review PTI decisions was challenged by the state. 7I N.J. ~t 108. 363
A.2d at 333. The court conceded that court rules did not provide for such review
and based its jurisdiction on its authority to interpret court rules. ld. at 108-09,
363 A.2d at 333-34.

598

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

the use at trial of program reports as well as statements made during
participation in PTI.30 This protection was enhanced by the inclusion of all PTI records and reports within the scope of Rule 1: 38,
which protects the confidentiality of court records. a1 The rules also
require judges to inform defendants of application procedures for
PTI programs. a2
The requirement that the prosecutor provide written, reviewable
reasons for any decision concerning PTI admission represents a policy
of expanded judicial review of prosecutorial discretion. Traditionally,
the courts have been reluctant to interfere in prosecutorial decisions
because of the prosecutor's position as a representative of the executive branch histOrically vested with broad discretionary powers. aa
30. N.J. CT. R. 3:28, Comment (Pressler ed. 1976).
31. N.J. CT. R. 1:38, Comment (Pressler ed. 1976). This protection is repeated
in Guideline 5. The court emphasized that the maintenance of a counselor-patient
relationship is more important than the need for disclosure at trial, and that the
use of information gathered in a PTI program would be "contrary to basic standards
of due process and fundamental fairness." GUidelines, supra note 2, at 874.
32. N.J. CT. R. 3:4-2, Comment (Pressler ed. 1976).
33. See In re Ringwood Fact Finding Comm., 65 N.J. 512, 526, 324 A.2d 1, 8
(1974) (Pashman, J., concurring and dissenting in part). See also State v. Conyers,
58 N.J. 123, 147-48, 275 A.2d 721, 733-34 (1971) (trial court should honor prosecutor's request to waive the death penalty although jury verdict called,· by
implication, for that sentence); Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 210, 225, 265 A.2d 678,
686 (1970) (reversed chancery division's grant of summary judgment for declaratory
judgment against Attorney General's memorandum asking local officials for reports
on potential civil disorders: "It is a serious matter for the judiciary to interfere
with the preventive measures devised by the executive branch . . . ."); State v.
LeVien, 44 N.J. 323, 326-27, 209 A.2d 97, 99 (1965) (individual who killed fellow
mental patients had no right .to have criminal proceeding brought against him);
State v. Murphy, 36 N.J. 172, 177-78, 175 A.2d 622, 625 (1961) (error for trial
court to issue subpoena on its own motion for statement that prosecutor had agreed
not to use at trial: "A prosecutor may sensibly decide . . . not to use evidence
which would advance the State's case"); State v. Walls, 138 N.J. Super. 445, 449,
351 A.2d 379, 381 (1976) (trial court may not require prosecutor to conduct a
lineup).
The federal courts have refused to review prosecutorial decisions unless the
prosecutor denies a constitutional right or unconstitutionally discriminates against a
defendant. "[T]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in
itself a federal constitutional violation," unless "selection [is] deliberately based upon
an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification."
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). See also Newman v. United States,
382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
This approach is illustrated in United States v. Smith, 354 A.2d 510 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1976). There the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld a prosecutorial policy of denying diversionary program admission to any defendant who litigated
any issue in his case. Smith was denied admission because he made a pretrial motion
to dismiss, alleging that the penalty he faced violated the eighth amendment. The
court held that, since he could have raised the constitutional issue after the prosecutor
considered his eligibility for diversion, the prosecutor's policy did not prevent Smith from
exercising his eighth amendment rights. The court stated, however, that any prosecutorial policy that had that objective or effect would be invalid. ld. at 514. The same
court subsequently upheld a District of Columbia Superior Court order requiring
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There has been, however, some indication in New Jersey of judicial
interest in overseeing prosecutorial discretion. In State v. Winne 84
the supreme court held that a county prosecutor· could be found
guilty of common law nonfeasance in office without a showing of
corruption or willfulness. 35 The court rejected the argument that
removal by impeachment is the "sole remed[y] available to the State
for any misconduct of a county prosecutor" 86 and declared that the
prosecutor "must at all times act in good faith and exercise all reasonable and lawful diligence in every phase of his work." 87 In In re Investigation Regarding Ringwood Fact Finding Committee 8S the court
announced, but did not exercise, its power "within the extraordinarily
comprehensive prerogative writ jurisdiction" to review prosecutorial decisions. 3o In Leonardis the court appears to have taken the first steps
toward actually reviewing a prosecutor's discretionary acts.
Nonetheless, the court has not indicated the proper dimensions of
prosecutorial discretion with regard to PTI programs. 40 Realistic stanthe prosecutor to produce written guidelines relating to the operati9D of the District's
First Offender Treatment Program. The order had issued because the defendant
alleged that he was refused admission to the program because of the political nature
of Iiis crime. The prosecutor refused to comply with the order and was thus held
in "technical" contempt. See In re Cys, 362 A.2d 726 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976).
The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals
refers to the "prosecutor's fundamental right to prosecute." Standard 2.2 states
that "[t]he decision by the prosecutor not to divert a particular defendant should
not be subject to judicia! review." NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS: COURTS REpORT 40-41 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as CoURTS]. The proposed Prosecutorial Discretion Act, a statutory PTI program,
would relegate all decisions about diversion to the prosecutor's discretion with no
allowance for judicial review. See N.J. Assembly Bill No. 1648 (1976); N.J.
Assembly Bill No. 906 (1976).
34. 12 N.J. 152, 96 A.2d 63 (1953).
35. The Bergen County prosecutor was indicted for failing to investigate illegal
gambling activities of which he was aware. Id. at 162, 96 A.2d at 68.
36. Id. at 171-72, 96 A.2d at 73.
37. Id. at 174, 96 A.2d at 74.
38. 65 N.J. 512, 324 A.2d 1 (1974).
39. Id. at 516-17, 324 A.2d at 3-4. In Ringwood the court reversed an order
compelling a prosecutor to present to a grand jury evidence of an election law
violation. The court stated that the election law authorized such orders, but found
that the prosecutor had not acted arbitmrily. Id. at 516, 324 A.2d at 3. The
court quoted approvingly Kenneth Culp Davis' criticism of judicial reluctance to
review prosecutorial discretion and his statement that "courts should continue their
gradual movement toward opening the judicial doors to review of prosecutors' discretion." Id. at 516 n.o, 324 A.2d at 3 n.o.
40. There has been increasing advocacy of "explicit [prosecutorial] policies for the
dismissal or informal disposition of the cases of certain marginal offenders." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 134 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CHALLENGE]; see also ADvISoRY CoMMlTI'EE
ON THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTIONS, A.B.A. PROJEcr ON STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 64-66,
84 (Approved Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSECUTION]; CoURTS, sup1'a note
33, at 39.
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dards for review are a prerequisite for effective reviewY The Leonardis
opinion and the Guidelines emphasize decisionmaking based on the personality of the defendant and his susceptibility to rehabilitation. Prosecutors are trained as lawyers, however, not mental health professionals.
Even trained professionals are not necessarily able to make reliable judgments similar to those demanded by the court. 42 If a prosecutor's conclusion that the defendant has low rehabilitative potential will satisfy
the court's demand for a statement of reasons, no meaningful judicial
review will take place.
Furthermore, neither Leonardis nor the Guidelines gives any guidance as to whether other typical prosecutorial concerns will be considered valid bases upon which to make admissions decisions. Would the
court allow a prosecutor to deny entry into PTI to a defendant who
could be rehabilitated and whose crimes fell outside the four offense
categories ordinarily excluded from admission under Guideline 3(i), but
which the prosecutor felt "were the kinds of offenses that should be most
vigorously prosecuted in view of the community's law enforcement
needs"? 43 Could the prosecutor consider the deterrent effects of prosecution? 44 Could the prosecutor choose to divert his "weak" cases and
prosecute his "strong" ones? 45 Would the court permit a prosecutor
with limited resources to prosecute only a few offenders selected at
random and to divert others charged with the same crime? 46 Would
the court consider it proper for the prosecutor to give any weight to
the feelings of the victim? 47
41. The Leonardis court suggests that there will be judicial review of two
aspects of the prosecutor's decision, the judgment of the seriousness of the offense
and the conclusion about rehabilitative potential. See 71 N.J. at 122, 363 A.2d
at 340. But without more explicit standards, prosecutors may be able to thwart
judicial review of PTI admissions decisions through the use of "boilerplate" language,
as they now avoid review of decisions not to prosecute by announcing that available
evidence is insufficient. See F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A
SUSPECT WITH A CiUME 154-56 (1969).
42. See note 2.'3 and accompanying text supra.
43. See CHALLENGE, supra note 40, at 133; see generally NIMMER, supra note
13, at 96.
44. Although Guidelines 1 ( a) and 1 (b) use the word "deter" in listing the purposes
of PTI, it appears that it is used to mean merely "prevent" rather than "prevent through
fear," its common meaning.
45. See generally NIMMER, supra note 13, at 13.
46. "Selective enforcement may also be justified when a striking example or a
few examples are sought in order to deter other violators, as part of a bona fide
rational pattern of general enforcement, in the expectation that general compliance
will follow and that further prosecutions will be unnecessary." People v. Utica
Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 12, 21, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128, 136 (1962).
47.
Local prosecuting officials concede that "great weight" is given to the
victim's desires in serious felony cases, especially homicides. This could
mean that if . . . the facts and circumstances of a case do not clearly
warrant prosecution for an unlawful homicide, the adamant victim could
overcome the prosecutor's reluctance to charge.

1977]

1975-76 N.J. SUPREME COURT TERM

601

In addition to the substantive questions raised by the court's new
approach to PTI, the Guidelines also add another layer of motions,
hearings, and appeals to the criminal justice system. Each decision,
such as whether the crime was one of those within the categories of
ordinarily excluded offenses, whether a previous offense was "serious,"
or whether the defendant possesses the requisite rehabilitative potential,
may be the subject of litigation. Although defendants face a heavy
burden in challenging prosecutors, the Guidelines allow defense counsel
to delay proceedings by contesting and appealing a variety of heretofore
unreviewable issues. As the Attorney General warned following the
Leonardis decision, "PT! will become another time-consuming facet of
an already lengthy process instead of serving its intended purpose of
expediting dispositions and permitting a reallocation of resources."·8

II.

DRUG TREATMENT

In State v. Alston 49 and State v. Sayko,50 the court affirmed the propriety of admitting defendants found guilty of drug possession into a
statutorily created drug treatment program. In so doing, the court
attempted to clarify the factors to be considered by the trial judge in
admissions decisions.
Section 27 of the New Jersey Controlled Dangerous Substances Act 51
provides an opportunity for first offenders charged with, or found guilty
of, possession of or being under the influence of certain "controlled dangerous substances" to receive treatment and to avoid the stigma of a
criminal conviction. The trial court may suspend proceedings and place
such defendants under supervisory treatment for a period not exceeding
three years. 52 Upon completion of the treatment program, the court
Hall, The Role of the Victim in the Prosecution and DispOSition of a Criminal Case,
28 VAND. L. REV. 931, 948 (1975). See also NIMMER, supra note 13, at 13. For
other criteria which prosecutors may feel are relevant to the decisionmaking process
and which appear to be outside the standard approved by the court, see NATIONAL
DISTRICT ATTORNEYS Assoc.: SCREENING OF CRIMINAL CASES 2 (undated); PROSECUTION, supra note 40, at 92-98.
48. Petition of State for Clarification and Application for Stay at 8, State v.
Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 363 A.2d 321 (1976). See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778, 787-88 (1973). An appreciation of the amount of litigation which the
court's policy might engender can be gained from estimates that there will be
13,000 applicants for PTI each year when the program is available statewide, and
that one half of those applicants (6,500) will qot be accepted for admission. Paul,
supra note 3, at 878. But see State v. White, 145 N.J. Super. 257, 367 A.2d 469
(Law Div. 1976) (evidence may not be presented to the court in order to substantiate
murder defendant's claim that program director and prosecutor acted arbitrarily in
denying PTI admission).
49. 71 N.J. 1, 6, 362 A.2d 545, 548 (1976).
50. 71 N.J. 8, 11-12, 362 A.2d 549, 551 (1976).
51. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21 (Supp. 1976).
52. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-27 (Supp. 1976).
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may dismiss further proceedings against the defendant. 53 Subsection
( c ), however, provides:
[P]roceedings under this section shall not be available to any defendant unless the court in its discretion concludes that:
(1) The defendant's continued presence in the community, or
in a civil treabnent center or program, will not pose a danger to the
community; or
( 2) That the terms and conditions of supervisory treabnent will
be adequate to protect the public and will ben-fit the defendant
by serving to correct any dependence on or use of controlled substances which he may manifest. 54

In Alston, a former police officer, found guilty of possession of heroin,
was admitted to a section 27 program over the prosecutor's objection
that Alston was ineligible because he was not found to be a drug user.
The prosecutor also contended that Alston was a danger to the community and thus ineligible under subsection (c), because successful
completion of a section 27 treatment program would permit him to
resume his position as a police officer. 55 In Sayko, the defendant, who
pleaded guilty to possession of L.S.D., amphetamines, and marijuana,56
was denied admission to a treatment program because he made no
effort to interfere with the drug involvement of his younger, less educated sister, with whom he shared an apartment. 57
The court determined that admission into a drug treatment program
was the proper disposition in both cases. 58 Based upon statutory
language which specifically included drug possession offenses,59 the court
rejected arguments that treatment could only benefit drug users. The
court found that, although the primary objective of the program is treatment of users, "[p] rospective users, early stage users or experimenters"
may also benefit from counseling and monitoring. 6o In addition, the
court noted that such defendants were "no less entitled" to the opportunity to avoid the stigma of a criminal conviction than "acknowledged
users." 61
53. In the event of a guilty verdict, a judgment of conviction would not be entered. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-27{b) (Supp. 1976).
54. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-27{c) (Supp. 1976).
55. 71 N.J. at 3-6, 362 A.2d at 545-48. Alston was acqUitted of possession of
heroin with intent to distribute. Id. at 3, 362 A.2d at 545-6.
56. Charges of possession with illtent to distribute were dismissed with the
consent of the state. Id. at 10, 362 A.2d at 550.
57. Transcript of sentence at 3-5, 10, 11, State v. Sayko, No. 711-JS-1972 (Law
Div. Union County, Dec. 6, 1973).
58. State v. Sayko, 71 N.J. at 7, 362 A.2d at 548; State v. Alston, 71 N.J. at
13, 362 A.2d at 552.
59. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-27{a) (Supp. 1976) lists offenses which deal with
obtaining, possessing, and being under the influence of certain amounts of specifiC
controlled dangerous substances.
60. 71 N.J. at 5-6, 362 A.2d at 547.
61. Id. at 6, 362 A.2d at 548.
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The court provided guidance in the use of subsection (c) in two
important respects. First, the court construed "a danger to the community" to refer only to the threat posed by the "defendant's conduct
while a participant in the program." 62 Thus, the fact that Alston might
have the opportunity to regain his position as a policeman after completion of the program was considered irrelevant to his admission to a
section 27 program. 63 Second, resolving a conflict in lower court decisions,64 the court declared that the trial court had discretion to exclude
defendants who satisfied the criteria set forth in subsection (c). 6Ii While
courts are not confined by subsection (c), the court in Sayko determined
that trial courts must use the "whole person concept" to determine
whether a defendant should be admitted to a treatment program. 66
Noting that Sayko was a college graduate, had just secured full-time
employment, was planning to get married, and was a first offender,
the court, applying the "whole person concept," affirmed the appellate
division's holding that the defendant's motion for admission to a section
27 program should have been granted. 67 The court found that, with
regard to Sayko's conduct vis-a-vis his sister, the trial court improperly
focused on the crime committed rather than on the general character
of the defendant. 6s In stressing the importance of adding personal
factors to the evaluation, however, the court may have prevented trial
courts from giving sufficient consideration to the seriousness of the crime
the defendant committed.
Alston and Sayko expand the scope of section 27 by removing ail
doubt as to its applicability in cases which do not involve proven drug
use. The court could have interpreted the word "supervisory treatment" and the reference to correction of drug dependence in subsec62. rd. at 7, 362 A.2d at 548.
63. The prosecution argued that a policeman with a background of posseSSion
of heroin may be a danger to the community. rd.
64. Compare State v. Bush, 134 N.J. Super. 346, 340 A.2d 697 (Law Div. 1975)
(any defendant who comes within § 27 ( c) must be admitted), and State v. Sayko,
No. A-1282-73 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (trial court criticized for not
making any findings on the basis of § 27 (c) criteria) with State v. Johnson, 137
N.J. Super. 27, 347 A.2d 543 (App. Div. 1975) (trial court's authority is not "circumscribed and defined solely" by § 27 ( c) ).
65. 71 N.J. at 13, 545 A.2d at 552.
66. rd. The whole person concept was described in State v. Green, 62 N.J.
547, 566-67, 303 A.2d 312, 322-23 (1973) as a composite picture of the character
of the defendant.
67. 71 N.J. at 13, 362 A.2d at 552.
68. The trial judge, however, had simply exercised his discretion in accordance
with the standard proposed in State v. Johnson, 137 N.J. Super. 27, 31, 347 A.2d 543,
545 (App. Div. 1975). There the appellate division determined that in sentenCing
deciSions, the court should consider the further criminal implications of the defendant's
conduct and the circumstances surrounding the criminal event. rd.
The supreme court's emphasis on considering the offender as opposed to the offense
is consistent with the policy established in PTI admissions decisions. See notes 1-48
and accompanying text supra.
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tion (c) to mean that treatment was available only to those who use
drugs. By refusing to confine section 27 to drug users, the court reaffirmed the state policy of more lenient treatment for minor first
drug offenses. 611

III.

RESTITUTION AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION

In State ex reZ. D. G. W.70 and State v. Harris,11 the court approved
the imposition of restitution as a condition of probation for juvenile
and adult offenders. In addition, the court established procedures
necessary to afford due process in sentencing where restitution is
imposed.
D.C.W., a juvenile, pleaded guilty to charges of breaking and entering, theft, and destruction of property, along with three other youths.
The juvenile and domestic relations court placed D.C.W. on probation for one year and required that he make restitution to a victim of
the offense as a condition of his probation. The probation department,
acting at the judge's order, determined that the youths had caused
$626 worth of damage at one of the schools they had vandalized.
D.C.W. was ordered by the probation department to pay one-fourth
of that amount, $156.50.'2 The defendant contested the authority of
the court to impose such a condition. 73
The supreme court held that the trial court possessed the authority
to impose restitution under the statutes authOrizing reparation or restitution as a condition of probation 74 and the statutes allowing probation for juveniles "upon such written conditions as the court deems
will aid rehabilitation . . . ." 75 The court found that restitution was
a rehabilitative measure and therefore was a valid disposition in juvenile matters. 76
In finding the existence of statutory authOrity for the imposition of
restitution, the court distinguished State v. Mulvaney 77 and State ex
reZ. M.L.,7R in which the court had required statutory authorization
independent of the general probation statute in order to validate the
imposition of fines and costs as a condition of probation. In Mul69. See note 13 supra.
70. 70 N.J. 488, 361 A.2d 513 (1976).
71. 70 N.J. 586, 362 A.2d 32 (1976).
72. 70 N.J. at 492, 361 A.2d at 515.
73. Id. at 493, 361 A.2d at 515.
74. Id. at 501, 361 A.2d at 520; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 168-1 (I971).
75. N.]. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-61 (Supp. 1976); N.J. CT. R. 5:9-9.
76. 70 N.J. at 500-01, 361 A.2d at 519-20.
77. 61 N.J. 202, 293 A.2d 668 (1972) (per curiam).
78. 64 N.J. 438, 317 A.2d 65 (1974). See also People v. Crago, 24 Misc. 2d 739,
740,204 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776 (Oneida County Ct. 1960); S. RUBIN, LAW OF CRIMINAL
COHRECTION 296 (ed. 1973) (restitution is not an authorized sentence unless made
so by statute).
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vaney, the court had determined that certain court-imposed costs
were improper because contrary to specific provisions of the statute
regulating award of court costs. 79 The restitution imposed in D.C.W.,
however, did not conflict with any express statutory provision. In
M.L., the court had found that the imposition of a fine on a juvenile
was beyond its statutory authority.8o In D.C.W., the court distinguished M.L. by declaring that payment of a fine is punitive, whereas
payment of restitution is rehabilitative. 81
In State v. Harris, the court upheld the use of restitution as a condition of probation for adult offenders. 82 Harris was convicted of
fraudulently obtaining money from the Bergen County Welfare Board
by concealing employment earnings. The trial judge imposed a suspended sentence and three years of probation, with a condition of
restitution of $1,0l2. 83 The court determined that, since the goal of
probation is rehabilitation, and the payment of restitution is rehabilitative, the general probation· statute authorized the imposition of
restitution on an adult offender. 84
In D.C.W. and Harris, the defendants attacked the procedures
used by the trial judge in fixing the amount and terms of restitution.
In response, the court determined that due process is satisfied by
providing a summary hearing. The court's findings need only be
supported by some factual basis, not a preponderance of the evidence. 85 The supreme court then outlined the procedures to be
followed in imposing restitution. First, the probation department
must conduct an investigation into the extent of damages caused by
the defendant and defendant's ability to pay. The department must
then prepare a written report specifying the method used to determine the losses incurred. The report should be made available to
the defendant prior to sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, the
defendant may dispute the contents of the report and present evidence in his own behalf. Except in extraordinary circumstances, the
defendant need not be allowed to cross-examine the sources upon
which the probation department relied. The judge should then determine the proper valuation method, the amount of damage for which
79. 61 N.J. at 204-05, 293 A.2d at 669-70.
80. 64 N.J. at 444, 317 A.2d at 68.
81. See State ex rei. D.C.W., 70 N.J. at 495, 497-98, 362 A.2d at 516, 518.
82. 70 N.J. at 591, 362 A.2d at 34.
83. The jury finding of guilt was not determinative of the amount of money involved. The amount of restitution was determined by the judge based on evidence
presented at trial and information in the presentence report. See id. at 590-91, 362
A.2d at 33-34.
84. ld. at 592, 362 A.2d at 35.
85. See State ex rel. D.C.W., 70 N.J. at 502-07, 361 A.2d at 521-23; State v.
Harris, 70 N.J. at 594, 597-99, 362 A.2d at 36, 37-39. While a defendant may challenge the allocation of damages among multiple defendants, there is a presumption
of proportionate liability against each defendant. 70 N.J. at 508, 361 A.2d at 524.
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the defendant will be held responsible, how much the defendant is
able to pay, and the terms of payment. The judge must also state
the reasons for his decision to impose restitution.
In D.C.W., the court remanded with directions to reestablish the
amount of restitution because the probation department, not the trial
court, had determined the terms of payment, and there had been no
hearing as to the defendant's proportional liability or his ability to
pay.S6 In Harris, noting that the trial court had not conducted the
requisite investigation and had not sufficiently considered the ability
of the defendant to pay, the court vacated the restitution condition as
being excessiveY In view of the defendant's financial situation as a
"welfare mother" struggling to support five children, the court found
that restitution served no legitimate penal purpose. ss
Harris may be read to prohibit imposition of restitution on defendants who are welfare recipients. 89 This might work to the disadvantage of such defendants. Since some form of punishment will often
be considered necessary if the offense and defendant's personal record are less favorable than in Harris, imprisonment may be imposed
on a welfare defendant whereas restitution would have been acceptable for an economically independent defendant. It is unclear how
trial judges will determine punishment in this situation. 90 Perhaps
judges will attempt to fashion more creative punishments, such as requiring some type of community service, which may in fact have
greater rehabilitative value. 91 .
While Harris may limit the application of restitution, both Harris
and V.C.W. continue the supreme court's expansion of due process
rights in sentencing. 92 Although the New Jersey Supreme Court has
gone farther than the federal courts,93 it may not have gone far
enough in establishing the procedure for deciding the quantum of
restitution and the standard for determining the effect of the sentence
on the defendant.
86. ld. at 503-04, 507-09, 361 A.2d at 521-22, 523-24.
8'7. 70 N.J. at 596-97, 362 A.2d at 37. For further discussion of Harris and
review of allegedly excessive sentences, see generally 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 657 (1977).
88. ld. at 596-97, 362 A.2d at 37.
89. The application of Harris could be limited to situations where welfare recipients
would have to make restitution to the same agency that must continue to provide the
recipient a subsistence allowance.
90. The trial court in Harris was obviously troubled by this dilemma. See Transcript of Sentence at 10-12, State v. Harris, No. S-295-73 (Law Div. Bergen County,
July 26, 1973).
91. See R. COLDFARB & L. SINGER, AFTER CONVICTION 141 (1973). The court
seems to favor such sentences. See State ex rel. D.C.W., 70 N.J. at 500 n.3, 361 A.2d
at 519-20 n.3.
92. See State v. Kunz, 55 N.J. 128, 259 A.2d 895 (1969).
93. For example, no statement of reasons is required in federal courts follOWing
sentencing. See, e.g., Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974); United
States v. Velazquez, 482 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1973).
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The court's newly adopted procedures closely parallel procedures
required in parole and probation revocation hearings,94 which merely
determine whether a violation of a previously established condition
has occurred. 95 In proceedings to establish restitution, however, a
new liability is being determined. Since the defendant has been
convicted in a proceeding in which he has had all of the procedural
rights of a criminal trial, it might be thought that assessment of liability should be relatively simple. There are, however, many complex questions involved in that determination. For example, the actual amount of damages is not necessarily proven at trial. In Harris,
the finding of guilt required no establishment of the amount illegally
taken by the defendant; in fact, the records and testimony were confused on that point. 96 The amount of damage actually caused by
any act is open to dispute. 97
Furthermore, it is not clear whether the New Jersey courts will be
able to impose restitution for damages resulting from acts other than
the precise ones of which the defendant was convicted. us If the courts
94. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); State v. Johnson, 133
N.J. Super. 457, 337 A.2d 387 (App. Div. 1975).
95. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:167-9, -10, 2A:168-4 (1971); Lathrop v.
Lathrop, 50 N.J. Super. 525, 534-35, 142 A.2d 920, 925 (App. Div. 1958).
96. Brief for Defendant-Apfellant at 2-16, State v. Harris, No. A-99-73 (App.
Div. Dec. 24, 1974). At tria the judge excluded as irrelevant evidence that the
defendant was not receiving support payments. Brief at 22. Such evidence, however,
would have been relevant to the issue of damages.
97. For example, in People v. Miller, 256 Cal. App. 2d 348, 64 Cal. Rptr. 20
(1967), the defendant defrauded the victim of $821 by failing to do promised construction work but was required to pay $8,600 as a condition of probation. The
balance was the court's determination of the loss that resulted from the criminal act.
98. Many states and the federal courts limit restitution payments to the crime for
which the defendant was convicted. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 305 F.2d 183,
187 (4th Cir. 1962); People v. Funk, 117 Misc. 778, 193 N .Y.S. 302 (Erie County
Ct. 1921). Other states, however, permit payments to all parties aggrieved by a
"course of criminal conduct." People v. Gallagher, 55 Mich. App. 613, 618, 223
N.W.2d 92, 95 (1974). The New Jersey statute could lead to either result. It
authorizes "restitution to the aggrieved parties for the damage or loss caused by his
offense . . . ." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:168-2 (1971). The proposed New Jersey
Penal Code does not deviate significantly. It provides for "restitution of the fruits
of his offense in an amount he can afford to pay, for the loss or damage caused
thereby . . . ." I NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMISSION, THE NEW
JERSEY PENAL CODE § 2C:45-1 (1971) (proposed).
Dicta in both V.C.W. and Harris may also be read to support either construction
of the New Jersey statute. For example, the court's repeated emphasis that sentences
should be tailored to the offender and not the offense may imply that a proper restitution order should include all ill-gotten gains or damage done by the defendant.
See, e.g., State ex rel. D.G.W., 70 N.J. at 508, 361 A.2d at 524; State v. Harris, 70
N.J. at 594, 362 A.2d at 36. Similarly, the limited standard of proof required and
the court's willingness to allow restitution payments where the a'mount was not properly specified in the indictment indicate that the conviction does not limit the scope
of the restitution payments ordered. State v. Harris, 70 N.J. at 597-98, 362 A.2d at
37 -38. On the other hand, there is language to support the adoption of the federal
approach. For example, "[tlhe restitution or reparation required may not go beyond
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are not so confined, the sentencing judge will have to consider additional factual issues. The limited scope of the summary sentencing
procedure may, however, expose the criminal defendant to what is
essentially a civil liability with less procedural protection than he
would have in a civil triaP9 The defendant has limited ability to
contest the probation department's determination of valuation. Such
civil defenses as proximate cause and comparative or contributory
negligence are unavailable to the defendant. Finally, the judge's
findings may be supported by less than a preponderance of the evidence. Although conditions of probation cannot be imposed without
the consent of the defendant,lOO that consent is given under threat of
a prison sentence. Consequently, it is no substitute for adequate
procedural safeguards.
The due process requirements adopted by the court are also inadequate for determining whether restitution will in fact serve a rehabilitative purpose. While many experts agree that restitution will often
be beneficial to the defendant, they do not necessarily agree that restitution is a desirable disposition for all defendants. lol Therefore, the
the actual loss or damage as established in the prosecution and must be directly
related to the crime." State ex rei. D.C.W., 70 N.J. at 500 n.3, 361 A.2d at 519 n.3,
quoting S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION, 200-01 (ed. 1963). Moreover, in D.C.W. the court indicated that as part of the required procedure prior to
sentencing, the probation department should "conduct an investigation of the incident[s]
contained in the complaint . . . ." 70 N.J. at 503, 361 A.2d at 521. This seems
to limit the scope of restitution.
99. The New Jersey stahlte authorizes both restihItion and reparation. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A: 168-2 (1971). "Restitution normally consists of reimbursement of that
sum of money which the defendant appropriated in the commission of his criminal
act . . .. Reparation is generally considered to be synonymous with tort damages ...." Best & Birzon, Conditions of Probation: An Analysis, 51 CEO. L.J. 809, 826
(1963).
100. N.J. CT. H. 3:21-7 requires the defendant to sign a receipt upon receiving
a copy of the conditions of probation. If he refuses to sign, he is resentenced.
101. The issue of whether restitution in general and in these cases in particular is
rehabilitative was not litigated in either case. Hence, the court's conclusions were
based on its own independent investigation. The court's conclusion that restitution is
rehabilitative was based on dicta from cases in other jurisdictions and quotations from
several books on penology. But the court's own authorities do not necessarily support
the view that restitution is always rehabilitative. For example, one of the quoted
authorities cited in both D.C.W. and Harris in support of restitution as a rehabilitative
tool has also stated: "To be sure, treatment considerations may indicate that restihItion should not be ordered. It is no magic formula. The backgrounds and needs of
the individual case should determine whether or not the stipulation is to be laid
down." D. DRESSLER, PnACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 241 (2d ed.
1969). Another commentator has reported: "A probation and parole agent in the
Wisconsin State Department of Public Welfare stated that he thought restitution
orders frequently interfered with the rehabilitation of probationers. He said that
probation was in danger of becoming a form of collection for victims rather than a
period of rehabilitation for probationers." R. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION
AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCING 105 n.15 (1969). See also
RUBIN, supra note 78, at 231-32 & n.130. It appears that in order for restitution to
have the desired effect, it must be considered as part of a total treatment program
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court should have included a requirement that the presentence report
attempt to evaluate the psychological impact of the sentence upon the
defendant. lo2

IV.

CONCLUSION

In considering the disposition of criminal defendants, the New
Jersey Supreme Court has given priority to the goal of rehabilitation.
The court has sought to establish procedures which would insure that
each defendant receives treatment tailored to his individual needs.
The desire for the criminal justice system to have a positive impact
on those with whom it deals has a long history in this country. loa Disillusionment wi,th the ability of prisons to achieve significant rehabilitative results has been growing, however.lo4 It remains to be seen whether
the use of alternative dispositions which the New Jersey Supreme
Court appears to be encouraging will be able to achieve the results
it was once sincerely believed that prisons could achieve. It may be
that the court will continue to find rehabilitation an elusive goal. Furthermore, the standards the court has used in discussing rehabilitation
may prejudice other objectives, su?h as equal treatment of offenders
and minimization of administrative arbitrariness. For example, deand' imposed only where it will serve the psychological needs of the particular defendant. Courts have long recognized that "[t]here can be no real reformation of a
wrongdoer, unless there is at least a willingness on his part to right the wrong
committed." People v. Lippner, 219 Cal. 395, 399, 26 P.2d 457, 458 (1933).
It is doubtful whether court-imposed restitution can be conducted in the voluntary
atmosphere necessary for rehabilitation. The initial decision to accept probation and
its concomitant conditions is made with a prison sentence as the alternative. Moreover, the coercive nature of probation increases after the terms have been established.
A defendant who feels that the making of restitution payments is wrong must consider
the fact that, by refUSing to continue making such payments, he will subject himself
not only to the sentence he originally escaped but also to treatment as if he had
committed an additional crime, to wit, probation violation. The defendant knows
that although probation violation is not really a crime, it is treated as such by the
courts. A court is likely to impose a higher sentence when probation is violated
than it would have imposed before the impOSition of probation. See, e.g., Remer v.
Ragan, 104 F.2d 704 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 553 (1939); In re White, 18
N.J. 449, 114 A.2d 261 (1955); State v. Driesse, 95 N.J. Super. 491, 494, 231 A.2d
835, 836 (App. Div. 1967). Furthermore, probation violation is part of a person's
record which is considered in sentencing for subsequent crimes. See DAWSON, supra,
at 82.
102. As indicated in note 23 supra and accompanying text, the courts may not be
able to make such a determination. This calls into question the legitimacy of imposing restitution if the court feels that it can only be justified as a rehabilitative tool.
103. See D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM 79-108 (1971). The system of indeterminate sentencing used throughout the country is an outgrowth of the
"rehabilitative ideal." See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCUON 53-58
(1968); Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM.
L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 226, 226-27 (1959).
104. See, e.g., O'Leary, Gottfredson, & Gelman, Contemporary Sentencing Proposals,
2 CRIM. L. BULL. 555 (1975); State Correction Chief Asks End To Indeterminate
Tel"q18 in Prison, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1976, at 40, col. 1. See also note 13 supra.

610

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

fendants accused of committing the same crime are to be treated
differently based on factors unrelated to their offense. lOO The vagtleness of such criteria and the fact that even professionals would differ
on particular judgments will make statewide uniformity and predictability in applying the court's standards difficult to achieve. loo

Charles Shafer
105. The New Jersey Supreme Court has implicitly approved criteria based on
whether the defendant belongs to a class of people likely to commit crimes. In
Leonardis, for instance, the court cited defendant Leonardis' employment and unblemished record and defendant Rose's full-time student status as "pertinent factors" relating to their "rehabilitative potential." 71 N.J. at 111-12, 363 A.2d at 335. The
same kinds of factors led tIte court in Sayko to conclude tItat the defendant should
have been admitted to a section 27 program. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
Use of these criteria is acknowledged I1S a "creaming" process in New Jersey PTI
programs. Zaloom, supra note 5, at 191. "This leads to a situation where persons
are punished for what it is believed tItey wiU do, ratIter tItan for what tItey have
done." O'Leary, Gottfredson, & Gelman, supra note 104, at 565 (1975). Judge
Frankel recognized the middle-class bias of "individualized justice" as being at war
with the concept of equal treatment before tIte law. M. FRANKEL, CmMINAL SENTENCES 10-11 (1972).
106. See Coffee, supra note 23, at 1373. This is tIte same danger presented by the
application of tIte rehabilitative ideal to other lhases of tIte criminal justice system:
"At every level-from prosecutor to parole-boar members--tIte concept of individualization has been used to justify secret procedures, unreviewable decision making, and
an unwillingness to formulate anything otIter tItan the most general rules or policy."
AMERICAN FRlENDS SERVlCE CoMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 40 (1971).

